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In Educational literature, Discovery Learning 
appears as an approach in which the learner builds up 
his/her own knowledge by performing experiments 
within a domain and inferring/increasing rules as a 
result. Such a constructivist approach has been largely 
exploited in the design of computational artefacts with 
learning purposes, the so-called Discovery Learning 
Environments (DLEs). One known feature of such 
environments is the autonomy degree required for 
students to succeed while handling a domain. 
Additionally, DLEs designers are often challenged to 
get students actually engaged. Such questions are on 
the basis of our concerns with the design and usage of 
particular DLEs, within which learning events occur 
as a consequence of contradiction detection and 
overcoming, during human/machine cooperative 
work. In this paper, we present an artificial agent 
capable of handling such a contradiction-driven 
approach of learning, by highlighting the exchanges 
that the agent should promote with a human learner. 
The conceptual model supporting the agent’s design 
relies on the scientific rationale, particularly the 
empirical approach guided by the theory-experiment 
confrontation. We shall reinforce the interest of the 
model for the design of DLEs by presenting its 
exploitation in a real learning situation in Law. Also, 
we suggest potential instantiations of the model 
elsewhere than in Human Learning. 
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1. Introduction 
The model of knowledge formalizing known as Phi-
calculus [16] has appeared as an attempt to abstract a 
successful approach practiced since 1994 by the 
lawyers of the Company Fidal-KPMG grouping 1200 
lawyers in France. Lawyer’s daily activity consists of 
understanding, proving and comparing contracts. The 
issue for innovation for them is that laws and norms 
change continuously, so contracts have to be conceived 
accordingly. The Company has identified classes of 
contracts, and for each class has decided to offer 
lawyers a Contractual Framework (CF). A CF 
represents the knowledge that enables the artificial 
agent fid@ct to assist the lawyers in their activity. 
Whenever the Company identifies a contract class, it 
delegates the design of the corresponding CF to a team 
composed of a senior lawyer and two novice lawyers, 
who are supposed to interact both with each other and 
with fid@ct aiming a CF.  
Fidal’s method to design a CF may be summarized as 
follows (Figure 1): after having analyzed a number of 
contracts previously written by experimented lawyers 
of the Company, the novice lawyers propose a CF, and 
then test and revise it under  
 Figure 1: Scenario of Fidal’s method
 
the supervision of the senior lawyer. The cycle is 
repeated until a CF is judged stable by the senior. CFs 
thus constructed are used by fid@ct to assist about 
400 lawyers of the Company, and it takes about 30 
minutes instead of several hours, for a lawyer to write 
a contract assisted by the agent. The Company has 
patented both the method and the agent fid@ct. 
While a Contractual Framework itself is the object 
of main interest for Fidal’s lawyers, from the 
perspective of Human Learning, we are mainly 
interested in its process of construction. The main 
question we address is: do novice lawyers learn 
something due to the interaction both with the senior 
lawyer and the fid@ct agent during the process of 
construction of a CF? In a previous paper [14], we 
argue on a characterization of a Learning 
Environment (LE) for Fidal’s method. As a starting 
point, we adopt as a principle the view of Human 
Learning as a potential, indirect side effect of 
Dialogues, the agreement resulting from discussions 
by eminent scholars, as summarized in [8].  
A popular property of LEs is that they often 
embody some “true” knowledge that is supposed to be 
“acquired” by the learner by interacting with the 
system. Socratic tutoring methods, on the contrary, 
attempt to emulate the autonomous discovery process 
for the causes of inconsistencies by the learner as a 
consequence of challenging him/her with dialectic 
arguments. In this direction, “the concept of discovery 
learning has appeared numerous times throughout 
history as a part of the educational philosophy of 
many great philosophers particularly Rousseau, 
Pestalozzi and Dewey, ‘there is an intimate and 
necessary relation between the process of actual 
experience and education [17]. It also enjoys the 
support of learning theorists/psychologists Piaget, 
Bruner, and Papert, ‘Insofar as possible, a method of 
instruction should have the objective of leading the 
child to discover for himself’[6,3]. In spite of these 
pedagogical suggestions, few LEs are founded on 
these principles. Rather, most Les developers wish 
“the truth in a domain” to be acquired by learners 
exposed to “the truth”. In Fidal’s method, in order to 
propose a CF, novice lawyers perform abstraction by 
themselves as they analyze achieved contracts in 
order to establish what terms should appear in a 
Contractual Framework for the corresponding 
contract class. Also, they infer autonomously logical 
constraints stressing relations among those terms, in 
a meaningful manner. In Human Learning, as stated 
by [7], building meaningful relations should reflect 
the student’s understanding of a domain, being a 
harder task than coming up with the concepts 
themselves. Moreover, within fid@act, the 
prominent view that the “true” knowledge should be 
in the machine is changed, since it is provided only 
with the capability of handling propositional 
constraints among terms. Such a capability allows 
the agent to work like a mirror, reflecting thus to the 
novices inconsistencies in the knowledge that they 
have externalized during the process.  
Discovery learning is also characterized as an 
iterative approach, in which errors work like a source 
of revision, as knowledge is supposed to be 
constructed by trial and error from experience. This 
issue is also present in the rationale of Fidal’s 
lawyers: inconsistencies detected are exploited 
aiming to improve a CF. The convergence, often a 
problem with this kind of approach, is achieved 
thanks to the fact that knowledge represented by RFs 
reflect the way of thinking and working of a group, 
and according to the Law to which they are submitted. 
This meets the constructivist views of learning: 
knowledge/learning are depending on context, person, 
and social situation [21]. 
Recent work [2] on EIAO privilege methods and 
tools facilitating the acquisition of meta–cognitive or 
soft skills, with respect to domain-independent “true” 
knowledge and skills. We see the development of 
cognitive skills as a potential consequence of 
discovery learning activities, since explanation and 
argumentation capabilities are crucial to perform tasks 
like build up a hypothesis or interpret experimental 
results such as required to revise or confirm 
hypotheses. Soft skills are also a requirement 
whenever the control is transferred to the learner 
interacting with a system [1]. In Fidal’s method these 
two (in principle controversing) perspectives co-exist 
and are even complementary since individuals are 
embedded in a collaborative environment. 
Collaborative work has shown its relevance both to 
learning [18,5] and in a widespread context [4]. In 
addition, recent work on ITS [44] points out to how 
discovery learning and collaborative learning may be 
brought together in order to design effective LE’s.  
The dialectic, autonomous, domain-independent, 
constructivist, and collaborative aspects of Fidal’s 
approach suggest us a positive answer to the question 
that we are addressing (do novices lawyers learn 
anything...?). Expecting to confirm our assumption 
(that the answer is positive), we have decided to 
expose real learners to the method. In order to support 
the learner’s work, we have implemented a Web-
ŋserved LE, called PhiInEd [15,13]. From a 
widespread perspective, the work on PhiInEd can be 
seen as an attempt to validate the model Phi-calculus 
when this latter meets the cause of Human Learning.  
In §2 we partially present Phi–calculus as a model 
for the design of DLEs; these could be thought of as 
artificial agents supposed to stimulate learning by 
handling contradictions, while interacting with a 
human learner. In §3 we focus on structural and 
dynamics components of the model itself. Then, in §4 
, a Web-served Learning Environment is presented as 
a particular instantiation of the model. In §5 we report 
a real study situation held upon that Web-server. In §6 
we point out to Phi–calculus potential exploitations 
beyond Human Learning. Finally, in §7 we present 
our concluding remarks and highlight ongoing work. 
 
2 Phi–calculus: a contradiction-driven and 
computer-aided human learning model  
In order to present Phi–calculus as a model for the 
design of DLEs we shall consider:  
• An Artificial Agent provided with no initial 
knowledge, but having two skills, namely, (i) 
handling propositional logical constraints, and (ii) 
learning from examples [34,33]; 
• An illustrating scenario developed upon a 
classical toy domain, which has been chosen in order 
to facilitate the presentation of both structural and 
functional elements of the model. Structural elements 
account for “Knowledge Types”, each of which 
representing a state that an evolving theory can 
assume. Functional elements account for the 
mechanisms required for each agent to contribute for 
the theory evolution; The whole formalizes what we 
have called a Reasoning Framework, the current 
abstraction for the notion of Contractual Framework 
introduced in §1 ; 
• A perspective of the exchanges that can take 
place between the Artificial Agent and a Human 
Agent (referred as to the Learner) while a theory is 
built/revised as a consequence of contradiction 
detection and overcoming. Such a perspective is 
based upon the speech acts ask and tell, which role is 
to model messages that carry out the Knowledge 
Types mentioned above.  
Considering the scientific rationale based upon the 
iterative and (eventually) converging cycle 
“experiment-and-theory”, three main phases are 
proposed to support the exchanges among the agents: 
(i) Collecting information, (ii) Analyzing and 
Prototyping, and (iii) Testing and Revising. Let us 
consider these phases in the context of a dialogue 
between a learner Human Agent and his/her 
Artificial Agent, during which the former one drives 
a study about a certain concept.  
 
2.1 Collecting information 
 
In this phase, the information available to feed the 
theory formation process is collected. This might be 
or not a process allowed by the Artificial Agent. Let 
us consider the negative case, and, thus, we shall not 












 Figure 2: Hypothetical available objects to begin the study of the concept “Arch”. 
 
 
Let us now start our hypothetical scenario by 
supposing that a History student  interested in 
historical monuments intends to formalize the concept 
of “Arch”. Let us suppose that, during a trip around 
the world, the student has taken some pictures in order 
to begin the study. The hypothetical images are those 
of Figure 2. 
 
2.2 Analyzing and Prototyping 
This phase should lead to (i) a Hierarchy of Terms 
representing the vocabulary supporting the study, and 
(ii) a Set of Constraints, which role is to constrain the 
usage of those Terms, as the constraints achieve 
formal relations among the Terms. The sub-phases 
leading to such structures are described below. 
 
2.2.1 Hierarchically organizing a vocabulary 
To go on with the hypothetical scenario introduced 
above, let us suppose that the student considers each 
object as being composed of a number of pieces, each 
one generally named, say, a form. Then he observes 
that the “forms” can be grouped together according to 
a classifying criterion, for instance, “to distinguish the 
forms that should roll when put on a planar surface 
from those that should not”. By using such a criterion, 
the student could obtain on the one hand, stable forms 
(square, triangle, rectangle, block), and, on the other 
hand, unstable forms (oval). Such a student’s 
reasoning would lead to a hierarchy as the one shown 
in the left-hand side of Figure 3. The exchanges 
needed for the agents to formalize such a hierarchy 
are shown in the right-hand side of Figure 3. 
 
2.2.2 Constraining a vocabulary 
The model suggests that, in a given moment, a 
theory is represented by an Axiomatics. Considering 
the dynamical character of a theory, Axioms may join 
or leave an Axiomatics, according to experiments 
carried out. The model allows for Axioms to join an 
existing. 
  
Figure 3: The Learner tells the Artificial 
Agent the vocabulary supporting the study. 
 
Axiomatics, according to experiments arried out. The 
model allows for Axioms to join an existing 
Axiomatics either in a direct or an indirect anner. 
The former case accounts for the situation in which 
the user is able to identify a certain elation between 
the objects being studied, and then build up the 
corresponding constraints to stress the relations. The 
latter case accounts for the situation in which the 
user recalls the Artificial Agent’s learning skill in 
order to look for suitable relations. Hereafter, we 
show the exchanges modeling the indirect case, to 
which the following subŋphases take place: (i) 
Describing Examples to the Artificial Agent, (ii) 
Building up Constraints out of the Examples, and 
(iii) Filtering Learnt Knowledge.  
 
Describing Examples to the Artificial Agent.  
In order to show up the exchanges allowing the 
Human Agent to describe an object to the Artificial 
Agent as an Example, let us consider the object 
named Example1 from Figure 2(a). These exchanges 
are shown in Figure 4: Example1 is described by 
stating that a square is present, a first block is 
present, a second block is present, and an arch is 
present. The description of an object corresponds in 
the model to the Knowledge Type “Theorem”, 
standing for a theorem to be proved out of the 
Axioms representing a theory. Once a Theorem is 
built, it may become an Example, such an operation 
modeling the fact that the Artificial Agent should 
memorize the object for latter use.  
 
 
Figure 4: The Learner proposes an 
object to the Artificial Agent. 
 
The Artificial Agent proposes a number of 
Constraints. Let us assume that the Artificial Agent 
knows the Examples representing the objects of 
Figure 2, and thus it is ready to learn general rules 
(Constraints) about them. The model Phi-calculus 
assigns each learnt rule to a Knowledge Type 
“Lemma”. The exchanges between the agents are 
shown in Figure 5, over two illustrating Constraints 
that could have been learnt from the provided 
descriptions of the objects from Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 5: The Artificial Agent tells 
Lemmas to the Human Agent. 
 
The Human Agent filters the Learnt Knowledge. 
Once he is informed about learnt Lemmas, the Human 
gent may analyze them in order to compose what is 
formalized by the Knowledge Type “Conjecture”. A 
onjecture should retain only those Lemmas estimated 
by the Human Agent as pertinent. Once the analysis is 
over, the resuting Conjecture is memorized by the 
Artificial Agent as an Axiomatics ready to be 
exploited. In Figure 6 we show the exchanges 
supporting the composition of a Conjecture and then 
its status changing to become an Axiomatics. In our 
scenario, we suppose that the Human Agent accepts 
as a Conjecture (then as an Axiomatics) both two 




Figure 6: The Learner tells the Artificial 
Agent a Conjecture. 
 
2.3 Testing and Revising 
Up to this point we have shown Phi-ŋcalculus 
through some of the exchanges required to build a 
theory. As stated before, the model assumes that a 
theory is something constantly evolving as a 
consequence of experiments carried out. Once the 
Artificial Agent knows an Axiomatics, the Human 
Agent may then test its validity, by proposing a 
number of objects unknown by the first agent and 
then asking this agent about the object’s Adequacy 
with respect to the current Axiomatics. The 
exchanges modeling such a situation are shown in 
Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Learner proposes an unknown 
object to the Artificial Agent, who judges the 
object as Inadequate. 
 
The testing object, proposed through the 
Knowledge Type “Theorem”, is the one shown on the 
left-hand side of the picture. The figure shows as well 
the exchanges allowing the Human Agent to know the 
object’s adequacy (with respect to the Artificial 
Agent’s current Axiomatics).  
At this point we reach the heart of Phi-calculus as a 
contradictionŋdriven approach to theory formation. 
The Inadequacy of an object declared by the Artificial 
Agent lies on the basis of a contradiction revealed 
while the agent confronts the object description with 
the current Axiomatics. A revision process should 
then take place in order to reach a coherent behavior 
for the Artificial Agent. Such a revision process 
would require, however, the Human Agent to know 
how to reestablish the coherent status of the theory. 
As this is not always evident, before such a revision 
process could take place, the Human Agent may need 
to find out why a contradiction arises. The exchanges 
are shown in Figure 8, in which the Human Agent 
asks the Artificial Agent the reasons of its judgment.  
 
 
Figure 8: The Learner asks the Artificial 
Agent the reasons of its judgment; the Agent 
answers. 
 
By means of the Knowledge Type “Object”, the 
Artificial Agent shows how the proposed object looks 
like to it: the resulting description is a result of both 
the description from the Human Agent and the 
propagation of the Constraints (Axioms) from the 
current Axiomatics. In our scenario, the Term Arch is 
evaluated both as present (as a consequence of 
propagating the constraint Block2 → Arch) and 
absent, (from the Human Agent’s description), thus, 
contradictory. Moreover, by means of the Knowledge 
Type “Proof”, the Artificial Agent shows to the 
Learner the Axioms causing its judgment (i.e., the 
violated Constraints).  
Having assumed the theory as over-constrained, the 
revision process consists for the Human Agent to tell 
the Artificial Agent to forget unsuitable Axioms. 
This may be a relatively simple way of revision. A 
more complex revision process is the one requiring 
to go back farest in the theory formation process, for 
instance, the need to reformulate the vocabulary and 
then to reformulate the Examples’ descriptions, and 
yet to ask the Agent to renlearn over the Examples, 
and so on. In fact, this whole reformulation would be 
the case if we would go on with our scenario, since, 
provided that we would relax the Axioms responsible 
for Inadequacy, the Artificial Agent would not be 
able to decide about the property of being an Arch 
neither for Example 1 nor for Counterŋ-Example 2. 
Excepting the evaluation of the Term Arch itself, the 
description of these two objects are quite similar, so 




3 A higher-level abstraction 
perspective for Phi–calculus 
In the previous section we introduce Phi–calculus 
as a model for the design of DLEs under a particular 
perspective: the one of the exchanges taking place 
between a Human Agent and his/her Artificial Agent 
during theory formation process. By means of those 
exchanges, i.e., the messages sent/received by the 
Agents, the Knowledge Types composing the model 
are introduced, as well as the way they relate to each 
other. In this section we propose to isolate those 
Knowledge Types along with their relation to each 
other, in such a way to abstract the model from a 
scenario view. We believe this higher-level 
abstraction to be useful since it would allow one to 
envisage a variety of scenarios different from the one 
presented in §2. Before concentrating in those 
Knowledge Types, however, let us briefly recall 
some notions from the history of sciences that have 
inspired some of our choices. 
 
3.1 Theorethical foundations 
 
To recall history is a very hard and dangerous task. 
When trying to do so, one takes the risk of naively 
omitting in his/her report people/work/events as 
important as those mentioned. That is the reason why 
we are definitely not the better placed ones to 
accomplish that task. On the other hand, however, 
since we borrow from that history a number of 
notions around which a great number of reflections 
have been taking place, we feel thus invited to take 
the risk and to highlight some of them. 
Dialectics, Contradiction, and Concept. In §2 the 
concept of Arch is exploited to introduce the model 
Phi–calculus. Alternatively, the concept of Bridge 
could have been used to motivate additional 
discussion about bringing up different concepts over a 
single vocabulary. In both cases, the notion of concept 
would be available to be handled by the user 
interacting with the system. However, it is also the 
case that the notion of concept have inspired the 
design of the model Phi–calculus itself. This should 
be rendered more explicit in what follows. Let us start 
by considering how philosophy has brought together 
the notion of concept with the one of contradiction 
and that of dialectics.  
Around the notion of dialectics, two main phases 
can be distinguished from philosophical thought: 
Greek origin of the term and Hegelian tradition [10, 
29, Dialectique]. The first one is concerned with the 
philosophy rationale: the dialogue drives a game in 
which each opponent tries to win by leading the other 
one to a contradiction. Platonian tradition put the 
dialectics as the art of learning to speak and to think, 
based upon the dialogue. 
The second phase around the notion of dialectics 
begins with Hegel, who sees “false” as a necessary 
step for attaining “true”. For Hegel, the thought is 
developed dialectically in a ternary rhythm: statement 
(thesis), negation (antithesis), and negation of 
negation (synthesis). Instead of a method, the 
dialectics is a process for producing “true”, out of 
contradictions. For him, every contradiction is built-in 
knowledge and, since the concepts are at the heart of 
knowledge, concepts are articulating contradictory 
thoughts. Hegelian dialectics has then as its center the 
notion of contradiction in detriment of the notion of 
dialogue [10, 29, Dialectique].  
With respect to philosophy of sciences the major 
interest on Hegelian dialectics is mainly due to the 
constructive role assigned to negation in concepts 
formation, as well as the status accorded to error as a 
moving element of knowledge [10, 29, Dialectique].  
Considering work from which Computer Science, 
and particularly Artificial Intelligence, can benefit, the 
notion of contradiction has been considered for 
around forty years ago within a Logical context, 
including the so-called Paraconsistent Logics [11, 41]. 
With respect to those achievements, the main 
difference to what we are proposing is that the known 
formal systems are able to handle contradiction in 
reasoning, while Phi–calculus in its current state is 
not. Contradiction is instead placed as an indicator 
that some revision is needed in current available 
knowledge.  
In his book Theories of concepts [45], Morris Weitz 
states that one can find a theory of concepts in the 
thought of every philosopher [29, Concept]. In fact, a 
number of philosophers have elaborated about the 
origin of abstract and general ideas: by abstraction, 
mind is able to isolate stable sets of characters shared 
by a number of individuals, and assign a name to each 
of these sets. Each set thus assigned by its name is a 
concept [10, Concept].  
Kantian thought, for instance, distinguish between 
a priori experience-free concepts, and a posteriori or 
empirical concepts. The former ones refer to a priori 
conditions of every knowledge, e.g., plurality, 
causality, etc. The latter ones, coming from 
experience, account for classes of objects or beings, 
and that is the reason why we often analyze them in 
terms of comprehension and extension [10, 
Concept].  
In contemporary epistemology, concepts are often 
considered under a theory of definition. A major 
question in contemporary sciences, relating the 
notions of concept and that of law, is that certain 
concepts seem to be conceived under the form of 
definitions involving conditional statements, as 
discussed by Hempel in his article “Fundamentals of 
concept formation in empirical science” [20]. Such a 
relation between concept and law has yet been 
highlighted by Sellars [39], who states that concepts 
always imply laws, without which they would be 
empty and undistinguishable [29, Concept].  
Nowadays, the term concept is often used to refer 
to designing results, to the extent considered in 
engineering. Such a current tendency seems to 
expand the usage of the notion beyond scientific 
contexts, like those of techniques and technologies 
[29, Concept]. 
Recalling contemporary sciences, particularly 
cognitive sciences, efforts are yet invested in order to 
understand how human acquire and represent 
knowledge (c.f. [28, Chapter 1]). Under a symbolist 
view, human knowledge is organized in hierarchies 
of concepts or categories. In such a context, a 
consensus seems to turn around the notion of 
categorization: to categorize is to group individuals 
aiming a certain objective, particularly in order to 
facilitate reasoning out of the established categories. 
Following that thought, a category refer to a number 
of individuals sharing several features. These latter 
are achieving a necessary and sufficient condition for 
an individual to be included into a category: its 
definition. Such a definition of definition of a 
category seems to correspond to Kant’s 
comprehension axis for concept’s analysis.  
In our work, we retain thus the idea of “definition 
in comprehension” and “definition in extension” of a 
concept or a category to refer to, respectively, (i) the 
set of rules necessary and sufficient to determine the 
inclusion/exclusion of an individual and (ii) the set 
of individuals such that corresponding descriptions 
respect the rules. We retain as well the idea of 
definition (in comprehension) of a category or a 
concept in terms of laws, following the claims from 
contemporary epistemology.  
There exist, however, an additional view of 
categories, which supposes the existence of a 
similarity measure between individuals, preceding the 
categories themselves (c.f. [28, Chapter 1]). This view 
is on the basis of the theory of prototypes. A 
prototype is an individual in the average the more 
similar one to each other individual in the category. 
Such an individual is said to be the most 
representative one of the category. According to this 
view, a category is given by a prototype and a floor. 
All the individuals close enough to the prototype 
(those having a similarity measure greater than the 
floor) belong to the category. We retain as well the 
definition of a category or a concept in accordance 
with that vision.  
 
Two approaches from scientific rationale. In this 
section we recall the two main approaches from 
scientific rationale grounding the dynamics 
underlying Phi–calculus, namely, (i) empirical 
sciences rationale (as initially elaborated by the 
empirist movement) and (ii) Popperian hypothetical-
deductive approach.  
As well-known, the so-called contemporary 
sciences’ method has its origins at the beginning of 
XV IIth century, with the ideas from Bacon [9]. 
According to Bacon, one would reach knowledge by 
collecting facts, by organized observation in order to 
elaborate theories. The movement known as 
Empirism is consolidated in the following century, 
claiming the exclusion from knowledge of anything 
not reducible to experience. Such a movement has 
initially lied on the verifiability principle, replaced 
later by that of confirmability. [10, Cercle de Vienne, 
Carnap Rudolph].  
In [36] Karl Popper elaborates a criterion allowing 
one to consider a theory as a scientific one. Popper’s 
“falsiability criterion”, also known as the 
“Refutability criterion”, becomes the heart of a 
philosophical movement which is opposite to 
Empirism: the scientific rationale is not inductive at 
all - it does not proceed by means of repeated 
observations and law formation. It is, on the contrary, 
hypotheticaldeductive: stating audacious conjectures 
comes at first, being such conjectures submitted then 
to experiments. While it had not been refuted, a 
scientific theory is nothing but a corroborated 
hypothesis [29, Popper Karl Raimund].  
While Popper had influenced knowledge in 
sciences with his Refutability principle as a criterion 
for deciding about the scientific status of knowledge, 
Imre Lakatos had contributed to knowledge in 
Mathematics. Lakatos had elaborated a logic of 
discovery in Mathematics also based upon the 
Refutability principle. His “Proofs and Refutations” 
logic [23] considers that knowledge in informal 
Mathematics is hypothetical, conjectural, and is 
developed by means of speculations and criticisms. 
The objective of such a logic is to study the 
construction of a proof and the establishment of its 
validity domain, through the analysis of examples 
and counter-examples to the proof. In this context, a 
proof is seen as a set of lemmas established by 
analyzing a conjecture and its sub-conjectures. The 
analysis of a proof is accomplished by proposing 
examples and counter-examples, in such a way to 
discover and to modify lemmas, according to the 
criticisms or the refutations to which the proof is 
submitted.  
As one could notice, the “Proof and Refutation”’s 
method demands an iterative and interactive 
approach, particularly, a dialectic approach, since it 
is based upon, on the one hand, on the elaboration of 
a Conjecture’s Proof and, on the other hand, on the 
criticisms for such a Proof.  
 
3.2 Knowledge types and their relations in Phi–
calculus 
In this section we introduce an elaboration for the 
model Phi–calculus under a more abstract view than 
the one presented in §2. As stated above, the aim of 
such an elaboration is to allow one to think of the 
model in a kind of scenario-free perspective, such as 
to be able to envisage other exploitations in terms of 
scenarios and potential applications different from 
the ones presented in the paper. Such a perspective 
for Phi–calculus (Figure 9) is grounded on the 
theoretical foundations from §3.1. 
 
 
Figure 9: Knowledge Types and their 
relations in Phi–calculus. 
 
Considering that each Knowledge Type 
represented in Phi–calculus gains its sense only when 
thought-of within the relations it keeps with the 
others, the heart of the model lies on such a theory 
formation “ontology”. As a matter of choice, we 
privilege in the following narrative the dynamics 
underlying the model than its structural features. 
Therefore, rather than concentrating in each 
Knowledge Type, one might observe the overall idea 
of how the two scientific rationale discussed above 
are brought together in order to compose the model.  
One possible way of analyzing the model is to 
consider a horizontal cut that would separate the 
Knowledge Types into two groups of six Types each. 
The upper segment (see Figure 9 ) accounts for those 
Types and relations involved in the Theory Testing 
process. This segment might be, by its turn, vertically 
divided into two sub-groups: Example, Theorem, and 
Fact (the Testing part), and Definition, Axiomatics, 
and Law (the Theory part). The Adequacy criterion 
relating experiment to theory (§2 ) is represented by 
the horizontal arrows relating one Type from Testing 
part to another one from Theory part. 
The lower segment from Figure 9 is representing 
the Theory Revision process. Similarly to the upper 
segment, one might divide it vertically into two sub-
groups as well: Principle, Lemma, and Proof, and 
Opinion, Conjecture, and Object. As one might also 
notice, the Knowledge Types represented in the left-
hand side vertical sub-group are obtained from the 
corresponding vertical sub-group in the upper 
segment (such a generation is represented by the top-
down arrows). This is to capture the idea that the 
elements often used to test a theory may be 
conveniently used to feed a revision process. As a 
result of analysis, revised knowledge is generated 
(generation is represented by the lower horizontal 
arrows) and yet additional analysis should take place 
in order to decide how to accommodate such revised 
knowledge within existent knowledge 
(accommodation process is represented by the 
bottom-up arrows). 
In order to reinforce the above mentioned 
suggestion, we believe that the way of typing 
knowledge and relating these types is really “just” a 
matter of choice. Of course, such a “just” should 
involve considerable investigation aiming at 
appropriate grounding, which is suitable since it 
would minimize the risk of eventual unsuccessful 
instantiations of the model. We think that the major 
importance within the proposed model is the way of 
bringing together in a synergetic manner two classical 
approaches on how scientific knowledge evolves. One 
possibility for further investigations would be to find 
out the limits of such a theory formation “ontology” 
by submitting it to application fields, as we started to 
accomplish in human learning.  
Potential scenarios. In the beginning of this 
section we argue on the interest of designing Phi–
calculus under a scenario-free perspective on the basis 
that such a view would allow one to envisage a 
variety of scenarios over the model. In what follows 
we reinforce this argument by presenting some of the 
scenarios that had been thought-of considering the 
domain of Human Learning. These are illustrated in 





Figure 10: Some possible scenarios over the model 




The scenarios are depicted essentially in terms of the 
role played by the individuals taking place, along 
with the interactions between them. As we show in 
§2 , these interactions would be designed on the 
basis of messages that would carry the knowledge 
typed according to the model. Scenario (a) involves 
both the Learner and the Teacher each of them 
interacting with an Artificial Agent (notice that the 
interactions between the Learner and his/her 
Artificial Agent correspond to those developed in §2 
).Scenario (b) involves the Learner interacting both 
with an Artificial Agent and with a peer (through 
their Artificial Agents). The characters in scenario 
(c) are the Learner and the Teacher each of them 
interacting with his/her Artificial Agent and with 
each other (through their Artificial Agents).  
In the following section we introduce a particular 
instantiation of the model Phi–calculus within 
Human Learning, more precisely, into a Web-served 
Learning Environment. This is achieved by 
combining both three scenarios which are organized 
according to the phases of a course.  
At this point, it is important to notice that 
interactions between the Learner and his/her peer 
often suggest a collaborative context, as it is 
considered by the Educational Community. One 
possibility of exploiting cooperation within Phi–
calculus is highlighted within the above scenario (b). 
In order to actually account for this scenario on the 
basis of the model, a co-construction mechanism 
should take place, in addition to an individual 
construction like the one presented in §2 . The 
current implementation of the server presented below 
allows “collaboration” only in a more strict view: 
students are provided with ordinary communicating 
mechanisms (like electronic mail), and also with a 
way of exchanging their work. Collaboration - based 
upon co-construction mechanisms - over Phi–calculus 
is a matter subject of our ongoing work.  
 
 
4 Instantiating Phi–calculus into a 
Web-served Learning 
 
The dynamics of knowledge construction 
underlying Phi–calculus has been exploited in the 
design of a Web-served Learning Environment called 
PhiInEd. Within the server PhiInEd, two phases of a 
course are currently taken into account, namely, 
Planning and Running [15]. Figure 11 illustrates the 
characters taking part in these phases, along with the 





Figure 11: Two phases of a course supported by 




Planning a course within PhiInEd consists of the 
elaboration of a Plan by the one who administrates the 
course, to which we refer as the Teacher. A Plan 
consists of a sequence of Lessons, to be studied by the 
ones who follow the course, each referred to as the 
Learner. The Teacher may provide each Lesson with a 
number of Resources and/or Exercises. Both 
Resources and Exercises are concretely provided by 
the server through Web pages. Resources may be seen 
as the course’s content, while through Exercises the 
Teacher asks the Learners to react with respect to 
Resources. Learner’s reactions are memorized by the 
server for later user by the Teacher/Learner’s peers, 
corresponding to what we call a Reasoning 
Framework in §1 .  
Altogether - observation of Resources and 
construction of a Reasoning Framework - are 
expected to stimulate the development of certain 
capabilities of the Learner. The enumeration of these 
capabilities constitutes the list of the Objectives of 
the course. Then, the Lessons established should be 
those estimated by the Teacher as capable of leading 
a Learner to reach the Objectives of the course. 
When elaborating the Plan, one possibility for the 
Teacher could be to think firstly in terms of Global 
Objectives, and then to decompose it into a list of 
Local Objectives from which the Lessons of the 




Running a course within PhiInEd consists of the 
execution of the course’s Plan, causing the Learners 
to study its Lessons, guided by the Teacher. Along 
the Running phase, individual work is provided by 
PhiInEd such as to enable the Learner to elaborate a 
Reasoning Framework as a consequence of 
observing Resources. Communication among 
participants is provided such as to allow (at least) 
both the Teacher to propose a Lesson to the Learner, 
and the Learner to present his/her RF to the Teacher 
and/or to his/her peers. 
The social level. The Running phase of a course is 
organized as a Sequence of Dialogues. Subjects of 
Dialogues correspond to the title of the Lessons from 
the Plan. For instance, a course which Plan has three 
Lessons, will be executed within three Dialogues, 
one for each Lesson. A Dialogue is composed of a 
sequence of Messages, and the Subject of a Message 
is, like for the Dialogue containing it, the title of a 
Lesson. The Teacher may declare a Lesson as 
Studied by a Learner, when the Dialogue about that 
Lesson has at least the two following Messages: (i) 
from the Teacher to the Learner, transporting the 
Lesson to be studied, and (ii) from the Learner to the 
Teacher, transporting the Reasoning Framework of 
the Learner corresponding to the Lesson subject of 
the Dialogue. Besides these two Messages, 
additional ones may occur in a Dialogue, in cases 
where a discussion takes place between the Teacher 
and the Learner about the study. 
 





Remark. Let us highlight that while the 
Teacher uses PhiInEd to elaborate (during the 
Planning phase) a Reasoning Framework particularly 
called a Plan, the Learner uses the same tool from the 
server to elaborate a Reasoning Framework (during 
the Running phase) as a result of studying a Lesson. 
The distinctions between the two Reasoning 
Frameworks rely on the vocabulary and on all 
elaboration coming as a consequence. While the 
vocabulary related to a course’s Plan includes terms 
like Lesson, Exercise, Task, Objective (and eventually 
content terms), and so on, the vocabulary handled by 
the Learner would be the one related to the content 
he/she is dealing with while studying the Lesson. 
 
 
5 A contradiction-driven study of 
Contractual Techniques in Law 
 
In this section we focus on the interest of Phi-
ŋcalculus for the design of Discovery Learning 
Environments by reporting a real study situation held 
upon the server PhiInEd. We leave the hypothetical 
scenario developed in §2 upon the block’s world, and 
we recall the Law domain, already evoked in §1 . 
Here, a pedagogical context is voluntarily created. A 
class of twenty-seven students of D.E.A. (Diplôme 
d’Etudes Avancés), from Université Montpellier I, 
Montpellier (France), under the supervision of Prof. 
Dr. Didier Ferrier (referred as to the Teacher), have 
been using the server during seven sessions of three 
hours.  
The subject of study. The chosen subject of study 
for the course was the so-called General Conditions 
of Sale (GCS). The definition of GCS requires the 
understanding of the process of formation of a 
contract. This latter is established whenever an offer 
meets an acceptance resulting in an agreement that 
constrains the behavior that the two sides intend to 
adopt with respect to the other. In such a context, the 
GCS are defined as an offer of contracting addressed 
by a seller to any buyer interested on acquiring his 
products. This offer constitutes then the individual 
norm of the behavior that the seller intends to impose 
to his potential buyers. The unconditional adhesion 
of the seller’s conditions by a buyer should be 
enough to form the contract, and the individual norm 
composed of the seller’s conditions becomes then the 
norm common to the two parties.  
The scenario. (Figure 12 ) The Teacher has 
initially chosen the GCS as the subject of study. A 
Reasoning Framework (RF) should then be 
constructed for this contract class. The goal was to 
obtain a single RF as a result of the work of the 
whole group. Firstly, students were distributed in 
seven working groups, each group working around a 
single machine. Each group should then prepare a RF 
by analyzing a GCS document from the Web. 
Secondly, a single RF should be generated as a fusion 
of RFs from the groups. Finally, this resulting RF 
should be revised under the supervision of the 
Teacher, up to be considered by the group as stable.  
The reader is invited to remark in the above 
scenario the similarity voluntarily kept with Fidal’s 
method scenario (Figure 1 ). In spite of the fact that 






Figure 13: Learner’s Message box: Message asking him/her to  





significative difference lies on the fact that the source 
of Examples here is the Web. 
Below, we describe the study carried out upon the 
server according to the two phases of a course 




Global Objectives. These were stated as “To be able 
to elaborate, criticize and improve particular 
contracts; to be able to apply general contractual 
techniques to specific contract classes.” The resulting 
Plan. The course was planned along six Lessons, each 
of which is introduced hereafter, through its local 
objectives, Resources/Exercises, and a report on how 
the students carried it out. Notice that Resources are, 
in the server, Web pages giving technical support to 
the corresponding conceptual notion of Example 
from the model. Examples here are not Arch 
pictures, but legal contracts.  
On the other hand, Exercises have no 
corresponding conceptual notion in the model, they 
are here as a way to provide some guidance for the 
students during the study.  
 
5.2 Running 
Lesson 1: An overview of the server. The Local 
Objective is to apprehend the server through its 
components, their functionalities and information 
they handle. By means of an example ŋ a very 
simplified RF of General Conditions of Buying ŋ all 
the components are covered for the students to 
become familiarized with the work needed to 
construct a Reasoning Framework. A Resource is 
supplied with an explanative text, which is available 
in a Web page, while the students explore the server 
through the RFŋ-example. Figure 13 shows a 
screenshot of the Learner’s Message box: the 
Message asking the group to study Lesson 1. Students 
exhibited curious to discover PhiInEd, and some of 
them had preferred to work individually, instead of in 
groups. Also, they found it not evident to apprehend 
in a first moment “all the concepts” of the server. 
Lesson 2: Let’s start to work. The Local Objective is 
to stimulate the capacity of abstraction by analyzing 
examples. Concretely, to apprehend the notion of a 
good GCS from GCS documents. No Resource is 
foreseen for this Lesson. Part of a RF of General 
Conditions of Sale (GCS) is supplied, as a starting 
point for the work. Such part consists on a Hierarchy 
of Terms, voluntarily prepared to be incomplete. As 
an Exercise, the students are asked firstly to observe 
the Terms and how they are organized. Then to 
search on the Web, and then to retrieve, a page 
containing a GCS. They are instructed to analyze this 
page, and to improve the Hierarchy accordingly. 
Figure 14 illustrates the work from one group. 
Figure 14: The work from one group: GSC document chosen from the Web (left-hand side) and Terms 
Hierarchy after some modifications (right-hand side). 
 
 
Faced with a real case to work out, students found 
positive the fact of working in small groups, since 
they could discuss with each other. In some cases, 
discussions were even too long: 20 minutes before 
they could agree on adding a single Term! They 
became more familiarized with the server, and even 
suggested improvements concerning the edition of 
the Terms Hierarchy. This necessity was due to the 
dynamism on updating the initial Terms Hierarchy, in 
part caused by discussions, in part caused by the 
progressive analysis of the Web page they have 
chosen to study. 
Lesson 3: Entering a Document, and Constraints. 
One Local Objective is to be introduced to the 
activity of exemplification, i.e.: to instantiate a 
contract in a RF. Another Local Objective is to learn 
the link between clauses in a GCS, by constraining 
the use of Terms in clauses, through the identification 
of logical relations among Terms. The single 
Exercise asks students to describe the contents of 
their working GCS document, by using the Terms of 
their working Hierarchy. The Exercise asks them as 
well to identify relations among Terms and then to 
build up the corresponding Constraints. Figure 15 
shows some of the Constraints from one group, who 
worked out a GCS document for spectacle tickets. An 
example of Constraint is “group fee excludes 
individual fee”. Students exhibited an initial 
difficulty to build up Constraints, although these were 
introduced in Lesson 1 through a simplified RF. Such 
a difficulty was quickly overcame, due both to the 
practice, and overall, to the understanding that 
Constraints were nothing but a formal way of 
stressing relations among Terms representing clauses, 
something to which they are, as lawyers, actually 
familiarized.  
Lesson 4: We present our results. A first Local 
Objective of this Lesson is to stimulate the capacity 
of comparison between an abstraction and an 
example. Concretely, since students have built a RF, 
they are supposed to have in mind the notion of a 
good GCS (at least their own!), and thus, they should 
be able to identify in GCS documents both positive 
and negative points with respect to their RF. Up to 
this point students work organized in seven groups. 
In this Lesson they are invited to work as a whole 
group. The single Exercise asks each group to present 
their RF to the larger group, to present their analysis 
about the RF they received, the Terms and 
Constraints they created, and yet to criticize the GCS 
they have chosen with respect to their own RF. 
Another Local Objective is to stimulate the capacity 
of argumentation and explanation, by means of 
debate: in case of different viewpoints (between 
groups) when students compare their RF with other’s 
GCS documents, or even their RFs to each other. 
Before starting the expositions, the groups exchange 
their RFs by sending a message to each group. The 
results presented were more complementary than 
conflicting to each other. An interesting case was the 
one of two groups that had chosen, as a coincidence, 
the same Web page to work out. They had, as 
expected, some common results, but also they had 
perceived different aspects in the document, over 






Figure 15: The work from one group: Chosen Web page of GCS (left-hand side) and some added Constraints 
(right-hand side). 
 
Lesson 5: How about putting altogether? The 
Local Objective is to reinforce the capabilities 
stimulated in Lessons 2, 3, and 4: after knowing the 
others’ work, students should formalize what they 
eventually apprehend from the debate with the larger 
group. Concretely, they should compose a reduced 
group responsible for generating a single RF, as a 
result of merging the RFs from the groups. The single 
Exercise asks students to consider the RF of their 
corresponding group, and to create a new RF resulting 
from all RFs together.  
Voluntarily, a member of each group presented 
himself to compose the reduced group. They have 
adopted the strategy of performing partial fusions 
(two by two) due to the amount of information they 
obtained as a result of a single fusion. Finally, the 
complementarity observed in the previous session was 
not so confirmed, since they discussed yet a lot, 
before arriving to a final result. This lead us to think 
that even if they do not agree with other’s work, 
students hesitate in criticizing. The fact of working 
together around a common and concrete objective 
seems to provide an actual collaborative environment, 
in such a way to make them naturally criticize without 
having the feeling of “hurting” their peers.  
Lesson 6: Finally, did we reach an agreement? The 
Local Objective is to improve the notion of a good 
GCS that students have built up to this point. By 
proposing a number of GCS documents specially 
chosen to stimulate revision, the Teacher together 
with a group of several invited lawyers attempt to 
invalidate the Reasoning Framework representing the 
agreement among twenty-seven students.  
Some specific points have hardly been identified by 
the invited lawyers in order to provoke the debate 
foreseen for this last Lesson, suggesting that an 
agreement was reached (achieving such an agreement 
represents is the model the criterion of a stable 
Reasoning Framework). Some improvements were 
orally pointed out but not performed on the RF, due to 
the lack of time.  
 
 
6 The contradiction-driven 
rationale beyond Human 
Learning: further investigations 
At a conceptual level, the work reported in this 
paper turns around the interactive knowledge 
construction, or yet, knowledge construction by 
means of human/computer collaborative work. 
Particularly, we approach knowledge construction 
through a theory formation perspective, which is 
grounded on the inductivist rationale brought together 
with a hypothetical-deductive approach. Additionally, 
we believe that the intended synergy for such a 
compound comes from the notion of contradiction, as 
it is on the basis of knowledge evolution allowing the 
dynamics of the overall process. As a result of our 
conceptual work, a knowledge construction model - 
Phi–calculus - is proposed, relying on knowledge 
evolution along human/computer interaction being 
driven by contradiction detection and overcoming.  
In previous sections, we show how Phi–calculus 
may be instantiated within a particular domain, the 
one of Human Learning. For such, we proceed as 
follows: (i) firstly we observe a well-succeeded 
practice (Fidal’s method) aiming at examining it with 
respect to the discipline’s state-of-the-art; (ii) then we 
actually instantiate the model by means of a scenario 
view that motivates the design and implementation of 
a Web-served Learning Environment and (iii) as a 
third step, we submit such a tool to a real case of 
study in Law.  
In the current section, we point out to the potential 
of the model of being exploited in other domains, 
namely, for the design of Systems for aiding 
Discovery, within the field known as Computational 
Scientific Discovery (CSD). The reason we keep the 
discussion under a perspective of the model’s 
potentiality considering CSD, is that the third above 
step carried out for Human Learning is yet to be 
accomplished for that former domain.  
Although the current discussion is about scientific 
knowledge and its emergence, we invest less effort on 
approaching CSD through the scientific rationale 
underlying Phi–calculus (although that appears 
implicitly into the narrative). Rather, we inspect the 
literature in order to argue in favour of user’s 
intervention along the process of knowledge 
discovery supported by computational artefacts: we 
believe such an intervention to be crucial for 
contradiction detection and overcoming. 
From Discovery Systems to Systems for aiding 
Discovery. The research on computational modelling 
of discovery process has strongly contributed for the 
automation of such a process. Decades ago, it has 
been proposed to consider a discovery system as a 
problem solving system [35] guided by heuristic 
search methods. AM [31], EURISKO [32], BACON 
[26], GLAUBER [27], and BOOLE [30] constitute 
some of the classical discovery systems largely 
known by the satisfactory results they exhibit on 
simulating historical discoveries from science. On the 
other hand, as stated by Simon, Valdés-Pérez and 
Sleeman [40], efforts are today needed to guide the 
development of systems capable of solving problems 
in cooperation with domain experts. According to the 
authors, such systems would play an important role in 
discovery processes since, when dealing with 
complex domains, there is no much hope to 
successfully embody into the system an achieved 
theory (even because it is constantly evolving). As a 
consequence, a system which design has accorded 
minor attention to the interaction with the system’s 
user (or user’s group) will possibly not succeed in 
accounting to knowledge evolution in its working 
domain. Thus, instead of designing discovery 
systems, an alternative perspective is to think of 
Systems for aiding Discovery, if one is interested on 
the system’s capability to account for continuous 
evolution of its user’s domain knowledge. In our 
teams, such an approach has been largely exploited to 
the design of systems (e.g. [19, 37, 12]) as Rational 
Agents [38], to the extent that they are able to build 
theories under the supervision of an expert. Indeed, 
theories that Rational Agents are able to build in 
cooperation with an expert, exhibit properties required 
by a scientific theory, namely predictability and 
explicability in the context of experimental 
improvement.  
Jong and Rip [22] discuss the “computer-aided 
discovery environments” as a future designing 
perspective for integrating a variety of tools available 
for (a group of) scientists. As largely known, the 
scientific rationale includes a number of 
phases/processes: scientists identify a problem, then 
they must find an adequate representation for it, they 
collect data by observation or experiment, and then 
they find out regularities and generalisations 
describing data. As a consequence of the development 
of increasingly powerful AI tools, new possibilities 
are foreseen for discovery environments to support 
such phases/processes. For Jong and Rip, the set of 
integrated computational tools compose thus a 
computer-aided discovery environment. The authors 
highlight, however, the fact that such an integration 
should account for a “socio-technical system” view. 
The expression is borrowed from organisation theory 
[42] and, within the context of computer-aided 
discovery environments, it would refer to the way by 
which the available tools are brought together in order 
to be effective in practice. Jong and Rip propose a 
number of guidelines to the development of future 
computer-aided discovery environments.  
Yet relevant recent work from the CSD community 
point out to the benefits of the computer-aided 
discovery approach. Such benefits appear concretely 
through the results obtained by a number of systems 
capable of supporting the accomplishment of totally 
original discoveries. For instance, Pat Langley [24, 
25] recalls AI research into CSD and its recent 
application to the discovery of new scientific 
knowledge. As an evidence of the advantages of such 
human/machine cooperation, Langley reports seven 
examples of new (computer-aided) discoveries that 
have appeared in the corresponding scientific 
literature. He highlights the role played by humans in 
each case. Going further, Langley suggests five 
phases for computational scientific discovery in 
which human intervention may influence system’s 
behaviour. The author explicitly recommends the 
computer-aided discovery approach, instead of 
criticizing human intervention, as often done in past 
AI.  
In the same direction, Raúl Valdés-Pérez [43], 
analyses a number of discovery systems that had 
accomplished totally new discoveries by playing the 
role of collaborators of the scientists involved. By 
such an analysis, the author aims at extracting 
regularities that would serve to guide the design of 
future systems. Valdés-Pérez proposes thus a list of 
recommendations that, according to him, are there to 
complement those proposed by Jong and Rip in [22]. 
The guidelines are identified, yet according to the 
author, by proceeding his analysis under a perspective 
of individual collaboration scientist/program.  
Discussion. From what is presented in this section, 
we highlight some basic premises as promising 
candidates to ground the work around interactive 
knowledge construction: (i) within the discipline 
known as Computational Scientific Discovery, the 
systems designed have revealed the important role of 
inductive approaches when dealing with (automated) 
discovery processes; (ii) in a relatively recent past, 
one tendency was to focus on systems’ inductive 
capabilities in detriment (or even the explicit 
rejection) of the role played by the designer and/or the 
user along discovery processes; (iii) according to AI 
current tendencies, the scientific community seems to 
agree that a major place to human intervention should 
be assigned when dealing with such kind of problem; 
(iv) that is possibly due to the contribution of human 
intervention to successful discovery processes, both 
recent and classical ones; (v) human intervention 
needs to be explicitly considered in future projects, 
and this have been taken into account by a number of 
scholars who propose several guidelines after 
analysing successful projects.  
By looking at the scientific rationale, such a human 
intervention combined with inductive approaches 
suggests us an iterative dynamics allowing scientific 
knowledge evolution. We strongly believe that, in 
such a context, the notion of contradiction would have 
its contribution to give, as it actually allows one to 
detect inadequacies between what is formalized under 
the form of a theory and what is represented from 
observation/experiment. Moreover, we also believe 
that such a notion has its contribution to give in 
domains not necessarily involved with scientific aims, 
i.e., formalized knowledge with no (universal) 
original pretension at all. As an evidence, one could 
look at fidal’s method (§1 ), in which new knowledge 
is considered only in a subjective/inter-subjective 




In §1 , we introduce an iterative and interactive 
method used by lawyers to render explicit the 
knowledge that enables an artificial agent to assist the 
tasks of contract analysis, verification, and 
construction. We also make the assumption that 
novice lawyers taking part in the process of 
knowledge explicitation learn something, thanks to 
the interaction both with humans and with the 
artificial agent. Such an assumption is firstly 
supported by the identification of some features 
previously pointed out by researchers from the 
Educational Community as important for learning 
events to occur in a Learning Environment. The 
results of the work carried out by real learners - as 
presented in §5 - are for us an evidence (even if 
informal) that our initial assumption was right.  
The main focus of our work is on the exam of how 
contradiction rationaly emerges from ŋ and 
simultaneously drives - the interactions between a 
human agent (or group) and an artificial agent both 
embedded in a process supposed to result in 
considerable intellectual gain for the human side. 
Concerning Human Learning, the source of general 
criticisms addressed to the discovery learning 
approach, i.e., the convergence of the learning process 
(often dependent on the student’s autonomy degree), 
does not appear to us a major impeachment for 
Phiŋcalculus to succeed. Taking a careful look at 
some of the features of Fidal’s method, one might 
notice that something there particularly conspires in 
favor of convergence: the fact that knowledge built up 
has no universal pretension at all, it is instead 
emerging from a group and to (be exploited by) a 
group that intends to reach an agreement. However, a 
formal answer to the question “under what conditions 
the contradiction-driven theory construction process 
underlying the model actually converges” is yet to be 
provided. Moreover, in spite of empirical evidence of 
the success of Phiŋ-calculus as a model for the design 
of Discovery Learning Environments, a formal 
experiment is also foreseen. Ongoing work include 
investigating how the notion of contradiction can by 
exploited to actually guide the theory revision 
process. Also, collaborative work is to be investigated 
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